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Is job insecurity higher in leveraged buyouts? 
 
Nick Bacon, Kim Hoque and Mike Wright 
 




This paper assesses whether job insecurity is higher in leveraged buyouts (LBOs) than 
elsewhere. It draws on matched employer-employee data from the British 2011 Workplace 
Employment Relations Study linked to data from the Centre for Management Buyout 
Research. The analysis finds no consistent evidence of higher job insecurity in LBOs as 
measured by workforce reduction practices (redundancy rates, job security/ no-compulsory 
redundancies policies and redundancy consultation), dismissal rates, labour use practices 
(non-permanent employment contracts and outsourcing), and employees’ job security 
perceptions. Job insecurity is no higher in either current or former LBOs than elsewhere. 
Contrary to what might be expected, it is also no higher in private equity-backed LBOs, 
management buy-ins, or high-debt LBOs, and there is only partial and weak evidence of 
higher job insecurity in short-hold LBOs. Job insecurity is also no higher in perfect storm 
LBOs (PE-backed management buy-ins that are short-holds with high-debt). Concerns over 
the negative implications of LBOs for job security thus appear misplaced.  
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Interest in financial capitalism, which involves an increased role for financial markets and 
investment institutions in the global economy, has grown significantly in the past decade. 
One specific form of financial capitalism – leveraged buyouts (LBOs) – has attracted 
considerable attention, particularly regarding its potentially harmful effects for labour 
(Appelbaum and Batt 2014; Bacon et al. 2004, 2013; Pendleton et al. 2014; Wood and 
Wright 2009). LBOs involve changes in ownership when investors such as private equity 
funds or groups of incumbent managers acquire underperforming firms (or divisions of firms) 
with a view to improving performance prior to sale typically five to six years later. The 
acquired firm is obliged to service the debt used for purchase and managers are provided with 
equity incentives to improve performance (Gilligan and Wright 2014). 
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 Specific concerns have been raised regarding the damaging implications of LBOs for 
workers’ job security. For example, drawing on case studies of European LBOs, the Party of 
European Socialists has expressed concerns regarding the divestiture of non-core operations 
leading to significant and rapid job cuts (PSE 2007). It concluded that restructuring in LBOs 
is ‘inimical to the wider social interest … leaving others in the society to pick up the cost’ 
(ibid.: 4). Such costs, which may persist after the LBO is sold, include compulsory 
redundancies, limited social dialogue to mitigate restructuring, and replacing permanent 
workers with temporary workers.  
In response to such concerns, the labour movement has waged a concerted 
international campaign to highlight the negative impact of LBOs on job security (PSE 2007; 
ITUC 2007). This campaign argued that certain types of LBO have especially deleterious 
effects, in particular: private equity (PE) backed LBOs1 and management buy-ins2 led by 
outsiders who lack identification with the workforce and emotional bonds to the firm (PSE 
2007: 206); short-term LBOs that limit long-term investment (ibid.: 15); and LBOs 
characterised by high indebtedness (ibid.: 17). Inquiries by governments and financial 
regulators in many OECD countries have augmented these concerns (Evans and Habbard 
2008). Most notably, pressure from the European Parliament and the French and German 
governments resulted in the European Union’s Alternative Investment Fund Managers 
Directive (AIFMD 1), adopted in 2010, which introduced requirements on capital, leverage 
and reporting for PE funds. The European Union’s consultation on AIFMD 2 anticipated in 
2019 will revisit this legislation, with the Party of European Socialists previously arguing 
AIFMD 1 did not go far enough (House of Lords 2010: 9).  
However, in contrast to the labour movement’s concerns, studies drawing on 
nationally representative data from various countries conclude LBOs have little overall 
impact on net employment (and by implication, on job security) (Amess 2018; Tåg 2012; 
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Wright et al. 2009). Although net employment initially declines in LBOs (Amess and Wright 
2007, 2012), this decline is less than 1% in PE-backed LBOs after two years compared to 
control groups (Davis et al. 2014), and thereafter employment growth is similar to non-LBOs. 
LBOs thus appear to undergo a process of ‘creative destruction’ (ibid.: 3958) in which initial 
downsizing of non-core or low value operations is offset by subsequent employment growth 
in profitable operations.  
However, this cannot necessarily be interpreted as suggesting LBOs have little 
negative effect on job security. For example, although net employment might remain stable, 
redundancy rates may be higher if the LBO reduces jobs in one part of the business while 
simultaneously increasing workforce size elsewhere (Davis et al. 2014). Additionally, 
dismissal rates for underperformance may be higher, and permanent employees might be 
replaced by non-permanent or agency contract staff. Little systematic assessment of 
nationally representative data has been conducted to date on these broader job security 
indicators. Although Bruining et al.’s (2005) study reported no change in job security/ no-
compulsory redundancies policies, internal promotion and use of temporary workers 
following LBOs, it assessed only a narrow range of job security indicators and lacked a 
comparison group of non-LBOs. Our paper overcomes these limitations (and thus makes a 
distinctive contribution to the literature) by drawing on nationally representative data with a 
non-LBO control group, and by exploring a wide range of job security indicators, including: 
workforce reduction practices (redundancy rates, job security/ no-compulsory redundancies 
policies and redundancy consultation); dismissal rates; labour use practices (use of non-
permanent contract workers and employment outsourcing); and employee perceptions of job 
security.  
The paper makes further distinctive contributions by considering whether LBOs have 
legacy effects on job security after sale, due to reduced investment or the persistence of a 
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culture of value extraction. Additionally, we seek to identify whether job insecurity is higher 
in the types of LBOs the labour movement argues have the most deleterious effects (PSE 
2007), specifically: PE-backed LBOs; management buy-ins; short-hold deals; LBOs incurring 
high indebtedness; and potentially worst-case scenario LBOs comprising a perfect storm of 
all these characteristics.  
The analysis is conducted using a unique dataset constructed by matching data from 
the Centre for Management Buyout Research into the 2011 Workplace Employment 
Relations Study.  
 
2. LBOs and different job insecurity indicators 
Two main theoretical perspectives associate LBOs with increased job insecurity: agency 
theory and wealth transfer theory. Agency theory frames LBOs as restructuring transactions 
that improve corporate governance to remedy the agency costs associated with publicly-listed 
corporations. Although managers in publicly-listed corporations are, as agents of owners, 
expected to maximise shareholder value, they may also utilise the firm’s resources for their 
own private benefit, thus generating agency costs that reduce shareholder value (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). Examples of such costs – which are most likely in firms with significant free 
cash flow – include ‘empire-building projects with low or negative returns, bloated staffs, 
indulgent perquisites, and organizational inefficiencies’ (Jensen 1989: 67). Agency theory 
suggests LBOs address these costs by focusing managers’ attention on firm performance in 
three ways: first, investors engage in direct monitoring of the firm; second, senior managers 
are provided with significant equity stakes to align their interests with those of owners; and 
third, servicing the debt used to acquire the firm restricts unnecessary expenditure. This 
heightened attention on performance is in turn likely to increase managerial efforts to 
5 
 
restructure the firm. However, this restructuring could have negative implications for job 
security given that it may involve downsizing, closure and divestments.  
Regarding wealth transfer theory, this views the firm as a nexus of contracts that LBO 
investors will rearrange in order to transfer wealth from employees to the new owners 
(Shleifer and Summers 1988). LBO investors and managers from outside the firm are 
considered more willing than incumbent managers to abrogate long-term contracts with 
employees (regarding job security, for example) in order to facilitate extensive restructuring. 
This is required to service interest payments and pay down debt in order to return retained 
earnings to investors. Less funding is thus available for job security-enhancing employment 
practices (avoidance of redundancies and hiring staff on permanent contracts, for example), 
than would be the case in publicly-listed corporations. As such, LBOs are considered hostile 
to workers because outside investors and managers seek personal enrichment in part by 
reneging on job security promises.  
Drawing on these two theories, the ensuing discussion develops hypotheses 
concerning the effects of LBOs on a range of job security indicators. 
 Turning first to redundancy rates, both agency theory and wealth transfer theory 
suggest LBOs will engage in rapid restructuring and thus favour redundancies over more 
gradual workforce reduction. Agency theory suggests direct monitoring by LBO investors 
will help ensure managers pursue this course of action, while wealth transfer theory suggests 
investors will have few concerns over abrogating long-term contracts regarding redundancy 
avoidance. According to PSE (2007: 189-209), LBOs are thus unlikely to follow good 
practice advice to avoid compulsory redundancies by reducing staffing through natural 
attrition, not filling vacant posts or early retirement (see ACAS 2014). They may also eschew 
job security/ no-compulsory redundancies policies (PSE 2007: 110) even where net 
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employment change is limited, given restructuring may involve large-scale redundancies in 
one part of the business while increasing workforce size elsewhere. Hence:   
  
H1a: Redundancy rates are higher in LBOs than in non-LBOs.   
H1b: Job security/ no-compulsory redundancies policies are less likely in LBOs than 
non-LBOs.  
 
LBOs may also eschew requirements for consultation with the workforce when 
handling redundancies. Agency theory suggests LBOs will address organisational 
inefficiencies by shutting down projects with low or negative returns as quickly as possible, 
and will not be prepared to delay to allow for consultation. Wealth transfer theory similarly 
suggests LBOs will be unconcerned about abrogating implicit assumptions regarding 
redundancy consultation (Appelbaum et al. 2013). Indeed, PSE (2007: 20 and 110) argues 
that LBOs will often withdraw from social dialogue and fail to honour existing collective 
agreements, with managers making decisions to cut jobs unilaterally. Additionally, even 
where redundancy consultation occurs, it might be anticipated that LBOs will be unwilling to 
change their plans and consider reducing the number of redundancies, redeploying affected 
employees elsewhere in the organisation, taking a longer-term approach, or mitigating 
negative effects on workloads (see ACAS 2014). Hence: 
 
H2a: Redundancy consultation is less likely in LBOs than non-LBOs. 
H2b: Where redundancy consultation takes place, positive changes to managers’ 




Turning to dismissals, agency theory suggests one element of investor monitoring will 
be to track and review the individual performance of managers and employees, with 
underperformance leading to dismissal (Jensen 1989). Wealth transfer theory similarly 
suggests that LBOs will dismiss underperforming staff to increase investor gains. This is 
supported by evidence of LBOs introducing performance management programmes involving 
threats of summary dismissal (Clark 2016: 245), and the opportunistic dismissal of staff when 
on sick leave or on holiday (PSE 2007: 201). Hence: 
 
H3: Dismissal rates are higher in LBOs than in non-LBOs.   
 
 Agency theory and wealth transfer theory also suggest that non-permanent 
employment contracts and outsourcing will be more widespread in LBOs. Consistent with 
agency theory, LBO investors may regard permanent employment contracts as an indulgent 
perquisite, and seek to replace them with fixed-term or agency contracts, or outsource work 
altogether to reduce costs and facilitate numerical flexibility. Wealth transfer theory also 
suggests LBOs will seek to cut costs by replacing permanent employees with fixed-term 
workers, agency workers or outsourced labour (ITUC 2007: 30). Supporting these assertions, 
PSE (2007: 110) argues ‘in the majority of cases full-time, sustainable jobs are lost’, with 
new jobs characterised by ‘low-skill, often temporary and sometimes precarious 
employment’. There is also evidence that LBOs outsource business activities to a greater 
extent than non-LBOs (Harris et al. 2005), with the labour movement highlighting instances 
of outsourcing that ‘left only a shell of a company’ (IUF/UITA/IUL 2007: 15). Hence:  
 




H4b: Fixed-term and temporary agency staff (where used) are more likely to carry out 
work previously done by permanent employees on open-ended contracts in LBOs 
than in non-LBOs. 
H5a: LBOs are more likely to contract out work to independent contractors. 
H5b: LBOs contract out a wider range of activities to independent contractors. 
 
 Given the above arguments, it is consistent with agency and wealth transfer theories 
that employees will feel less secure in LBOs than elsewhere. LBO investors may regard this 
as helpful in disciplining employees to accept reduced staffing levels and work harder 
(Goergen et al. 2014a: 150). However, no previous studies using nationally representative 
data have explored employee perceptions of job security in LBOs. Hence:  
 
H6: Employees are less likely to feel their job is secure in LBOs than in non-LBOs. 
 
3. Legacy effects  
Few prior empirical studies have sought to assess whether LBOs have lasting legacy effects 
on the workforce, even though understanding such effects is important to assess the economic 
and social impact of LBOs. It is unclear whether LBOs will have lasting legacy effects such 
that job insecurity persists in former LBOs post-sale to a corporate buyer or via stock market 
flotation. Wealth transfer theory suggests negative legacy effects will occur as a culture of 
wealth transfer and abrogation of implicit contracts becomes normalised in LBOs (PSE 2007; 
Froud and Williams 2007). Although these effects may fade over time, it might nevertheless 
be expected that job insecurity will be greater in former LBOs than in non-LBOs. 
 In contrast, agency theory suggests LBOs may not leave a legacy of job insecurity. 
Instead, agency costs may recur when LBOs return to ownership by publicly-listed 
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corporations, with managers resuming empire-building, over-staffing, indulgent perquisites 
and organisational inefficiencies. However, agency costs may not recur immediately after 
LBOs return to public trading (Bruton et al. 2002), given that although debt ratios are 
typically lower in former than current LBOs, they remain significantly higher than in 
publicly-listed corporations that have not undergone an LBO (Holthausen and Larcker 1996). 
The ongoing restriction to free cash flow will likely result in further restructuring and 
employment practices associated with higher job insecurity. Information asymmetry between 
the sellers and buyers of LBOs may also result in sale at peak operating performance, with 
subsequent decreases in performance after returning to public ownership (Degeorge and 
Zeckhauser 1993) being potentially harmful to job security.  
As such, agency problems might only re-emerge several years after the LBO is sold. 
Coupled with the likelihood that (as argued above) wealth transfer effects will fade over time, 
it might therefore be expected that while more recent LBO exits will have higher levels of job 
insecurity than non-LBOs, there may be little difference in job security between non-LBOs 
and older LBO exits. Hence: 
 
H7: Job insecurity is higher in both current LBOs and in recently-exited LBOs than in 
older LBO exits and non-LBOs. 
 
4. LBO types and job insecurity 
As indicated above, the negative impact of LBOs on job insecurity is attributed to the 
involvement of outsiders, short-termism and debt. Therefore, job insecurity may be especially 
pronounced in LBOs that are PE-backed, a management buy-in (rather than a management 
buyout), short-term, or have a high-debt ratio. The ensuing discussion develops hypotheses 
concerning the implications of these LBO types for job security. 
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Turning first to PE-backed LBOs and management buy-ins, both agency and wealth 
transfer theories suggest that job insecurity will be higher in such LBOs than in non-PE-
backed deals or management buyouts led by incumbents. According to agency theory, the 
promise of alpha returns incentivises PE general partners and buy-in managers to participate 
directly in strategy development and implementation (Jensen 1989), and this might result in 
particularly deep and rapid restructuring (and hence higher job insecurity). Wealth transfer 
theory suggests that such investors aim to ‘achieve significant personal gain from the default 
on stakeholder claims … irrespective of the outcomes for individual plants, firms, suppliers, 
employees or local economies’ (Appelbaum et al. 2013: 499). As outsiders, they lack 
identification with the workforce and emotional bonds to the firm, and will not feel obligated 
to uphold long-term contracts regarding job security (PSE 2007: 206; Shleifer and Summers 
1988: 41-2).  
However, the empirical evidence on this matter is mixed. On the one hand, Bacon et 
al. (2008) report job security/ no-compulsory redundancies policies, internal promotion and 
the use of temporary workers is no different in PE-backed than in non-PE-backed LBOs. On 
the other hand, consistent with the arguments outlined above, Goergen et al. (2014b) find 
significant net employment decline in PE-backed LBOs, and Amess and Wright (2007) find 
higher rates of employment decline in management buy-ins than in management buyouts. 
Hence:  
 
H8: Job insecurity is higher in PE-backed LBOs than in non-PE-backed LBOs and 
non-LBOs. 





Turning to length of hold, agency theory suggests short-hold LBOs will be 
particularly likely to engage in workforce downsizing via compulsory redundancies (rather 
than natural attrition) given the need for rapid restructuring within a short timeframe. In such 
instances, LBO investors are also likely to eschew forward workforce planning, job security 
policies (see: Bacon et al. 2012: 620-1) and redundancy consultation (PSE 2007: 110). 
Wealth transfer theory similarly suggests that short-hold LBOs will be particularly willing to 
default on long-term contracts with employees to increase the firm’s attractiveness for a 
quick sale (Appelbaum et al. 2013: 503). This might involve introducing a results-oriented 
culture to deliver short-term returns (ibid.: 508), which might lead to increased dismissals for 
underperformance. It might also involve replacing permanent employment contracts with 
cheaper, more flexible non-standard contracts. However, the impact of time to exit has rarely 
been studied systematically. Hence: 
 
H10: Job insecurity is higher in short-hold LBOs than in long-hold LBOs and non-
LBOs. 
 
Finally, job insecurity might be particularly prevalent in high-debt LBOs. Agency 
theory suggests the need to service debt in LBOs eliminates free cash flow and encourages 
rapid restructuring (Jensen 1989: 67), which is likely to increase job insecurity. Wealth 
transfer theory also suggests servicing high debt ratios incurred on buyout will require 
dramatic cost cutting (Shleifer and Summers 1988). As such, Appelbaum and Batt (2014) 
argue that excessive debt is a primary cause of downsizing and job insecurity.  
Case studies provide empirical support for these arguments. For example, PSE (2007: 
110) highlights examples of indebtedness leading to job losses and strain on redundancy 
consultation processes, failures to honour collective agreements and withdrawal from social 
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dialogue (ibid.: 20), and has called for the introduction of maximum debt ratios for LBOs to 
protect employment (ibid.: 26). Hence: 
 
H11: Job insecurity is higher in high-debt ratio LBOs than in low-debt ratio LBOs or 
non-LBOs. 
 
However, while we hypothesise that job insecurity will be particularly high in certain 
types of LBOs, it will arguably be highest in LBOs with several (or all) of these 
characteristics, with the combined effect of diverse financial mechanisms often highlighted in 
predicting negative labour outcomes (Appelbaum et al. 2013). For example, a ‘short-term 
focus on shareholder maximization’ combined with ‘the leveraged debt model’ (ibid.: 514) 
underpins the notion of ‘stripping and flipping’ (Elliott 2007), whereby assets are sold off and 
employment and investment are reduced to help pay down high debt and improve 
profitability, thus enabling a quick sale or stock market flotation. The resulting value 
extraction is likely to have adverse implications for job security. This is particularly likely to 
happen where such LBOs are PE-backed management buy-ins, given the investors, who have 
no emotional bonds to the workforce, are likely to engage in direct oversight to ensure the 
necessary operational restructuring is implemented. Hence, we evaluate job insecurity in 
perfect storm LBOs (PE-backed management buy-ins that are short-hold and have high-debt). 
Assessing this potential worst-case scenario for labour explicitly tests the claims of 
campaigns that target LBOs with multiple supposedly negative characteristics (PSE 2007): 
 





5. Data and Method 
Our dataset was constructed by matching the Centre for Management Buyout Research 
(CMBOR) database of UK buyouts to the 2011 Workplace Employment Relations Study 
(WERS 2011) (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills et al. 2014). This enabled a 
range of unique variables to be imported from CMBOR into WERS concerning whether the 
workplace is (or has been) bought-out, and characteristics of the buy-out. WERS is designed 
to be nationally representative of British workplaces with five or more employees within 
Standard Industrial Classification major groups D to O (agriculture, hunting, forestry and 
fishing, and mining and quarrying are excluded), when probability weighted to account for 
the over-sampling of larger workplaces. It contains a management survey and employee 
survey matched at workplace-level. The management survey comprises 2,680 observations 
with a 46.5% response rate. The respondent is the workplace manager with primary 
responsibility for employment relations matters. In total 1,572 workplaces are used in our 
workplace-level analysis once workplaces with missing data and public sector workplaces are 
excluded. The WERS survey of employees (sent to a random sample of up to 25 employees 
in 2,170 workplaces where the management respondent granted permission) comprises 
21,981 responses, with a 54.3% response rate (van Wanrooy et al. 2013). We use the linked 
WERS employer-employee data to evaluate employee perceptions of job security in LBOs, 
with 9,883 employee responses used once employees in public sector workplaces and 
observations with missing data are excluded.   
The CMBOR database has recorded LBOs and collected data on all buyout deals 
since 1980, hence it is the most comprehensive data source on LBO transactions, and is 
widely used across the management, financial economics and industrial relations fields. The 
database has no lower or upper deal size bound with data collected from primary (surveys of 
PE firms, advisors, for example) and secondary (media and stock exchange circulars, for 
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example) sources to provide a comprehensive dataset that uniquely identifies all LBOs in 
Britain.  
The CMBOR and the WERS data were matched with the assistance of the UK Office 
for National Statistics (ONS) using Inter-Departmental Business Register numbers (a 
comprehensive list of UK businesses used for governmental statistical purposes). This 
matching process identified that 147 workplaces in WERS 2011 had undergone a buyout 
recorded in the CMBOR database (once missing data are accounted for). As constructing the 
matched data set contravened normal WERS conventions on anonymity, the data were 
matched and analysed in the UK Data Service’s secure data lab.  
 
Dependent variables 
The dependent variables were taken from the WERS 2011 management survey and analysed 
at workplace level, except for the employee perceptions of job security variable, which was 
taken from the linked employee survey and analysed at individual level. Variable means are 
reported in Appendix Table 1.   
Redundancy and dismissal rates. These were calculated by dividing the number of employees 
made redundant and the number dismissed in the past year by the number of employees at the 
workplace a year prior to the survey date.  
Job security/ no-compulsory redundancies policy. Dichotomous measure in which 1= ‘policy 
of guaranteed job security or no-compulsory redundancies for non-managerial employees’ 
and 0= ‘otherwise’. 
Redundancy consultation. Two measures were developed. The first concerns whether (in 
instances where redundancies occurred) redundancy consultation took place, with 
management respondents being asked ‘Did you consult with employees or their 
representatives prior to making anyone redundant?’ (1= ‘yes’, 0= ‘no’). The second concerns 
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whether redundancy consultation led to a positive change. Management respondents were 
asked, in instances where redundancy consultation took place: ‘Did the consultation lead to 
any of the following changes in managers’ original proposals: reduction in the number of 
redundancies; changes in the criteria for selection; increase in redundancy payments; 
alternatives to redundancy; preparing employees for redundancy; strategies for 
redeployment?’. We constructed a measure in which 1= ‘managers answered positively 
regarding any of these outcomes’, and 0= ‘otherwise’. 
Non-standard contracts and contracting out. Measures for the proportion of employees on 
temporary/ fixed-term contracts and agency contracts were calculated by dividing the number 
of employees on these contract types by the total number of workplace employees. 
Management respondents were asked whether fixed-term employees or agency staff carry out 
work previously done by staff on open-ended contracts. We created separate dichotomous 
measures where 1= ‘yes, all of them’ or ‘yes, some of them’, and 0= ‘no’. Concerning 
contracting out, managers were asked: ‘Are any of the activities or services on this card (from 
a list of 11) carried out for this workplace by independent contractors?’ (e.g. cleaning, 
security, catering, maintenance). We created two variables: a dichotomous variable where 1= 
‘any contracting out’ and 0= ‘otherwise’; and a measure of contracting out breadth (count 
measure of the number of activities contracted out).  
Employee perceptions of job security. The employee survey asks whether respondents agree 
or disagree with the statement ‘I feel my job is secure in this workplace’ (five-point scale 
from 1= ‘strongly disagree’ to 5= ‘strongly agree’). 
 
Independent variables 
The independent variables outlined below were taken from the CMBOR database. Appendix 
Table 1 presents the means.   
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LBOs. Dichotomous variable in which 1= ‘LBO workplace’; 0= ‘non-LBO workplace’.  
Current and exited LBOs. Not all workplaces undergoing LBOs since 1980 remained bought-
out at the time of the WERS survey. To explore legacy effects, we created a categorical 
variable where 1= ‘Current LBOs’ bought-out at the time of the WERS 2011 management 
interview; 2= ‘Exited<6 years ago’ (former LBOs exiting less than 6 years prior to the WERS 
interview); 3= ‘Exited≥6 years ago’ (former LBOs exiting 6 years or more prior to the WERS 
interview); and 4= non-LBOs. We adopt a 6 year cut-point to allow sufficient time for the 
repayment or refinancing of buyout debt following exit. 
PE-backed LBOs. Categorical independent variable where: 1= ‘PE-backed LBOs’; 2= ‘non-
PE-backed LBOs’; and 3= ‘non-LBOs’. 
Management buy-ins. Categorical independent variable where: 1= ‘management buy-ins’; 2= 
‘management buyouts’ (including management-employee buyouts and employee buyouts); 
and 3= ‘non-LBOs’.   
Short/long-hold LBOs. Drawing on data on the buyout date and exit/sale date, we created a 
categorical independent variable where: 1= ‘short-hold LBOs’ (0 to less than 4 years); 2= 
‘long-hold LBOs’ (4 years or more); and 3= ‘non-LBOs’.  
Debt. Debt ratios are calculated at the buyout-level as total debt (senior debt + mezzanine 
debt + high-yield debt) divided by total finance. We created a categorical independent 
variable where: 1= ‘high-debt ratio LBOs’ with a debt ratio ≥50%; 2= ‘low-debt ratio LBOs’ 
with a debt ratio <50%; and 3= ‘non-LBOs’.3 
Perfect Storm LBOs. To calculate the effects of LBOs with multiple (potentially) negative 
characteristics, we created a categorical independent variable where: 1= ‘perfect storm LBOs’ 
with four specific characteristics (PE-backed; management buy-in; short-hold; high-debt); 2= 





All equations contain the following workplace-level controls: organisation size; log of 
workplace size; single independent workplace; SIC major group; national ownership; 
workplace age; union recognition; proportion of workforce female, ethnic minority, aged 50 
or over, part-time, and in each SOC major group. Equations assessing employee perceptions 
of job security also control for respondent’s: SOC major group; pay band; marital status; age; 
job tenure; highest qualification; part-time, temporary or fixed-term contract; union 
membership; ethnicity; gender; disability; and dependent children. Appendix Table 1 reports 
further details and means. 
 
Analysis Procedure 
To test hypotheses 1 to 5, workplace-level equations were estimated where the independent 
variable was the dichotomous LBO workplace measure and the workplace-level control 
variables were as listed above. The same equation was estimated with different dependent 
variables to test each hypothesis. Where the equations for redundancy rates (H1a), dismissal 
rates (H3) and proportion of staff on temporary, fixed-term and agency contracts (H4a) are 
concerned, a fractional logit model was used given these dependent variables are proportions 
naturally bounded between 0 and 1. Fractional logit models, unlike Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS), generate predictions within the unit interval and are appropriate where zero and one 
values occur within the data (Papke and Wooldridge 1996). Probit analysis was used for 
equations with dichotomous dependent variables: job security/ no-compulsory redundancies 
policy (H1b); redundancy consultation (H2a); effect of redundancy consultation (H2b); fixed-
term or temporary agency staff performing work previously done by permanent employees 
(H4b); any contracting out (H5a). The equation for the ‘contracting out breadth’ dependent 
variable (H5b) used a poisson model given the dependent variable is a count measure 
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(Cameron and Trivedi 1998: 9). 
To test H6 (whether employees are less likely to feel their job is secure in LBOs than 
in non-LBOs), the linked employer-employee data were used and an equation estimated at 
individual-level in which the dependent variable was employees’ perceptions of job security, 
and the independent variable was whether the individual’s workplace was an LBO or 
otherwise. This equation also included controls for the individual’s demographic 
characteristics (see Appendix Table 1 for details) and controls for the characteristics of the 
individual’s workplace. Multi-level mixed effects modelling incorporating both fixed and 
random effects was used to account for the data’s multi-level structure in which employee 
responses are nested within workplaces. This procedure allows the variance to be partitioned 
into within (Level 1) and between (Level 2) workplace variation. This enables between-
workplace variance to be controlled for, thereby avoiding violating assumptions of 
independent observations in multiple regression as employees within a given workplace are 
not independent from each other. In equation 12 in Table 1, the amount of variance in 
employee perceptions of job security due to between-workplace variation is 0.157/ 
[0.793+0.157]=16.5%. 
To test H7 to H12, the above procedures were repeated but the dichotomous LBO 
independent variable was replaced in turn by the categorical independent variables for: 
current and exited LBOs (H7); PE-backed and non-PE-backed LBOs (H8); management buy-
ins and management buyouts (H9); short and long-hold LBOs (H10); high and low-debt ratio 
LBOs (H11); and perfect storm and non-perfect storm LBOs (H12).  
The analysis was weighted throughout to account for the complex nature of the 
WERS survey design.5 This procedure allows unbiased population estimates to be obtained. 
In the multi-level model, the weights were scaled to ensure consistency across lower-level 
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clusters. The scaling specified that first-level (observation-level) weights were scaled so they 
summed to the sample size of their corresponding second-level cluster. 
 
6. Results 
Table 1 reports the analysis of job insecurity in LBOs relative to non-LBOs.6 There is no 
support for H1a that redundancy rates are higher in LBOs than in non-LBOs (equation 1), and 
no support for H1b, with LBOs and non-LBOs being equally likely to have job security/ no-
compulsory redundancies policies (equation 2). Additionally, the likelihood of redundancy 
consultation and of positive changes in response to consultation is no lower in LBOs than 
non-LBOs, hence there is no support for either H2a or H2b (equations 3 and 4). Where 
dismissal rates are concerned (H3), these are no higher in LBOs than non-LBOs (equation 5). 
There is no support for H4a that LBOs have a higher proportion of staff on temporary, fixed-
term or agency contracts than non-LBOs (equations 6 and 8), or for H4b that fixed-term/ 
agency staff are more likely to perform work previously done by permanent employees in 
LBOs (equations 7 and 9). LBOs are also no more likely than non-LBOs to use contracting 
out (H5a, equation 10), and contrary to H5b, LBOs contract out a narrower range of activities 
than non-LBOs (equation 11). There is also no support for H6 that employees in LBOs are 
less likely to feel their job is secure (equation 12).  
In short, there is no evidence in the results presented in Table 1 that job insecurity is 
poorer in LBOs than in non-LBOs.7 
 





Turning to LBO legacy effect, H7 proposes that job insecurity is higher in both current LBOs 
and in recently-exited LBOs than in older LBO exits and non-LBOs. The results in Table 2 
do not reveal a consistent pattern. Only one of the significant findings suggest support for H7, 
with equation 8 providing weak evidence (at the 10% level) that agency worker use is lower 
in LBOs that exited six or more years ago than in non-LBOs (but is not lower in LBOs that 
exited less than six years ago and current LBOs than in non-LBOs). This hints at the 
emergence of agency problems several years after the LBO is sold. Some job insecurity 
indicators (job security/ no-compulsory redundancies policies (equation 2) and redundancy 
consultation having a positive impact (equation 4)) are poorer in current LBOs, but not in any 
of the exited LBOs, than in non-LBOs. This suggests, contrary to H7, agency problems 
reappear soon after the LBO is sold.  
Beyond this, other results suggest job insecurity worsens in LBOs after sale. LBOs 
that exited six or more years ago (but not LBOs that exited less than six years ago) are more 
likely than non-LBOs to have fixed-term workers doing work previously done by permanent 
employees (equation 7), while current LBOs are slightly less likely than non-LBOs to have 
fixed-term workers doing work previously done by permanent employees. Also, the 
likelihood of agency staff doing work previously done by permanent employees (equation 9) 
and contracting out breadth (equation 11) are lower in current (but not any of the exited) 
LBOs than in non-LBOs.  
Overall, therefore, the results reveal no consistent pattern with regard to LBO legacy 
effects, and only one is weakly consistent with H7. As such, H7 is not supported.  
 





H8 is that job insecurity is higher in PE-backed LBOs than in non-PE-backed LBOs and non-
LBOs.8 Only one of the results in Table 3 supports this hypothesis, with contracting out being 
slightly less prevalent (at the 10% level) in non-PE-backed LBOs (but not non-LBOs) than in 
PE-backed LBOs. Against the hypothesis, however, the breadth of contracting out is higher in 
non-LBOs than in PE-backed LBOs (equation 11), and employee perceptions of job security 
are slightly poorer (at the 10% level) in non-PE-backed LBOs than in PE-backed LBOs 
(equation 12). There is no evidence PE-backed LBOs have higher job insecurity on any of the 
other indicators. Overall, therefore, H8 is not supported.9 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
Management buy-ins 
H9 is that job insecurity is higher in management buy-ins than in management buyouts and 
non-LBOs. Table 4 shows, in support of H9, that job security/ no-compulsory redundancies 
policies are more prevalent in management buyouts and non-LBOs than in management buy-
ins (equation 3). However, contrary to H9, dismissal rates (equation 5) and redundancy rates 
(at the 10% level (equation 1)) are higher in management buyouts than in management buy-
ins, and they are no different in management buy-ins than in non-LBOs. Also contrary to H9, 
agency staff are more likely to be doing work previously done by permanent employees in 
management buyouts (and non-LBOs at the 10% level) than in management buy-ins 
(equation 9), and contracting out breadth is greater in non-LBOs than in management buy-ins 
(equation 11). Furthermore, employee perceptions of job security are lower (at the 10% level) 
in management buyouts than in management buy-ins (equation 12). On balance, therefore, 










H10 is that job insecurity is higher in short-hold LBOs than in long-hold LBOs and non-
LBOs. In support of H10, Table 5 shows redundancy consultation is slightly more prevalent 
(at the 10% level) in both long-hold LBOs and non-LBOs than in short-hold LBOs (equation 
3). In addition, redundancy consultation is slightly more likely (at the 10% level) to have a 
positive impact in non-LBOs than in short-hold LBOs (equation 4). Also in support of H10, 
fixed-term workers are less likely to be doing work previously performed by permanent 
employees in long-hold LBOs and non-LBOs than in short-hold LBOs (equation 7), and 
contracting out is slightly less prevalent (at the 10% level) in long-hold than in short-hold 
LBOs (equation 10). 
However, contrary to H10, long-hold LBOs are less likely to have a job security/ no-
compulsory redundancies policy than short-hold LBOs (equation 2), and both long-hold 
LBOs and non-LBOs make greater use of agency staff than short-hold LBOs (equation 8). 
Beyond this, redundancy and dismissal rates (equations 1 and 5), the use of temporary/ fixed-
term contracts (equation 6), the likelihood that agency staff do work previously performed by 
permanent employees (equation 9) and the breadth of contracting out (equation 11) are no 
different in short-hold LBOs than elsewhere. In addition, employee perceptions of job 
security are no lower in short-hold LBOs than elsewhere (equation 12). 
On balance, therefore, while the results in relation to four of the measures suggest 
support for H10, the results in relation to the other eight measures do not (with two of these 
measures being in direct contravention of H10). As such, support for H10 is at best partial 
and weak.11  
 




High-debt ratio LBOs 
The results relating to H11 (job insecurity is higher in LBOs with high debt ratios than in 
low-debt ratio LBOs or non-LBOs) are reported in Table 6. In support of H11, job security/ 
no-compulsory redundancies policies are more prevalent in low-debt LBOs and non-LBOs 
than in high-debt LBOs (equation 2).  
 However, contrary to the hypothesis, although redundancy consultation occurred in all 
high-debt (and low-debt) LBOs,12 it is less likely to have a positive impact in low-debt LBOs 
(and non-LBOs at the 10% level) than in high-debt LBOs (equation 4). Also contrary to H11, 
employee perceptions of job security are poorer in non-LBOs than in high-debt LBOs 
(equation 12). On balance, therefore, H11 is not supported.13 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
 
Perfect Storm LBOs  
H12 is that job insecurity is higher in perfect storm LBOs than in non-perfect storm LBOs 
and non-LBOs. In support of H12, Table 7 shows non-LBOs are slightly more likely (at the 
10% level) than perfect storm LBOs to have a job security/ no-compulsory redundancies 
policy (equation 2). Also, contracting out is less prevalent in non-perfect storm LBOs (but not 
in non-LBOs) than in perfect storm LBOs (equation 10). 
However, none of the other results in Table 7 support H12. Indeed, contrary to H12, 
there were no redundancies in any perfect storm LBOs. In addition, the likelihood of agency 
staff doing work previously done by permanent employees is higher in non-LBOs and 
slightly higher in non-perfect storm LBOs (at the 10% level) than in perfect storm LBOs 
(equation 9). Particularly notable is that employees’ perceptions of job security are poorer in 
both non-perfect storm LBOs and non-LBOs than in perfect storm LBOs (equation 12).  
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Across the results as a whole, therefore, job security is not poorer in perfect storm 
LBOs than elsewhere. Indeed, employees report the opposite is true. As such, H12 is not 
supported. 
 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
 
7. Discussion and Conclusions  
This paper has sought to address the disjuncture within the literature between case studies 
suggesting LBOs have negative implications for job insecurity and quantitative research 
suggesting LBOs have little effect on net employment change, by providing the first 
systematic, nationally representative examination of the impact of LBOs on a broad range of 
job insecurity indicators. Our findings add to the existing quantitative research – which has 
the advantage of drawing on nationally representative data but focuses largely on net 
employment – by exploring other important job insecurity indicators including workforce 
reduction practices, dismissal rates, labour use practices and employee perceptions of job 
security. They also add to the existing qualitative research – which has the advantage of 
exploring a range of job insecurity indicators yet is often fragmented and potentially 
unrepresentative, and on occasion is arguably reported inconsistently14 – by providing a 
systematic, large-scale representative analysis. We also make a distinctive contribution by 
assessing whether negative legacy effects persist after the LBO is sold on, and by assessing 
whether job insecurity is higher in specific types of LBOs the labour movement identifies as 
particularly damaging (PE-backed, management buy-in, short-hold and high-debt LBOs). 
 Overall, our analysis found that LBOs do not appear to have negative job security 
implications when compared to non-LBOs regarding workforce reduction practices, dismissal 
rates and labour use practices. It also found employees’ perceptions of job security are no 
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different in LBOs than in non-LBOs. Therefore, the findings do not support previous 
arguments in the literature that LBOs have negative job insecurity implications (Appelbaum 
and Batt 2014; Appelbaum et al. 2013). Instead, they concur with the conclusions drawn 
from studies reporting limited changes in LBOs to net employment (Amess 2018; Amess and 
Wright 2007, 2012; Bacon et al. 2013; Davis et al. 2014; Tåg 2012; Wright et al. 2009), job 
security/ no-compulsory redundancies policies, internal promotion and use of temporary 
workers (Bruining et al. 2005).  
 Our conclusions are further reinforced by the results assessing job insecurity in the 
LBO types the labour movement specifically associates with poorer job security (PSE 2007). 
We found job insecurity to be no higher in PE-backed, management buy-in or high-debt 
LBOs, and we found only partial and weak evidence that it is higher in short-hold LBOs. Nor 
is job insecurity higher in supposedly worst-case scenario perfect storm LBOs with all of 
these characteristics. Our results for PE-backed LBOs are particularly notable given their 
consistency with prior reports that PE-backed LBOs do not have negative job insecurity 
implications (Bacon et al. 2008). This in turn suggests the widespread criticism of PE may be 
misplaced.  
 The question remains, however, as to why our conclusions differ so markedly from 
those based on case studies of individual LBOs. One interpretation is that in some instances 
LBOs may well have led to downsizing and job insecurity (as much of the case study 
research demonstrates). However, our analysis, based on nationally representative data, 
suggests these cases are far from the norm. As such, while LBOs may occasionally have led 
to higher job insecurity, this does not appear to hold for the average firm subject to an LBO 
in the population of firms as a whole. 
 With regard to theoretical implications, our analysis does not support predictions 
from either wealth transfer theory or agency theory. Wealth transfer theory argues investors 
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extract wealth from LBOs by abrogating long-term contracts and implicit assumptions 
regarding job security, thus gaining at labours’ expense. The results do not support this 
argument, with the similarity in employees’ job security perceptions in LBOs and non-LBOs 
in particular suggesting employees in LBOs do not perceive contract abrogation regarding job 
security. Where agency theory is concerned, while direct monitoring and oversight by LBO 
investors to address wasteful agency costs may well result in significant firm restructuring, 
our evidence suggests this does not lead to heightened job insecurity. Hence, while LBOs 
may address corporate waste and mismanagement, this does not appear to impose excessive 
job insecurity costs on labour.  
Also regarding theoretical implications, the counter intuitive finding that employees 
perceive higher job security in perfect storm LBOs than in non-LBOs is noteworthy. One 
potential explanation for this finding stems from entrepreneurial theories that regard LBOs as 
seeking to develop sustainable growth opportunities previously held back by financial 
constraints in publicly-listed corporations (Wright et al. 2000). Realisation of growth 
opportunities might require a combination of outside expertise (PE and new managers), high 
debt and a short-term orientation to ensure rapid development of the acquisition (in other 
words, perfect storm LBOs). If this sustainable growth in turn leads to higher job security, 
this would explain our finding that job security is higher in perfect storms than elsewhere. We 
can, however, only speculate on this potential explanation, hence further research on this 
matter is warranted.  
The findings also have implications for public policy, specifically the European 
Union’s consultation on AIFMD 2 anticipated in 2019. Given we find job insecurity to be 
similar for employees in LBOs and non-LBOs, the findings offer no support for increased 
regulation of LBOs to protect job security. The findings also suggest regulatory proposals 
targeting PE funds and management buy-ins, or recommending maximum debt ratios for 
28 
 
LBOs, will not result in higher job security. They also suggest that regulation of short-term 
LBOs will have only a marginal impact, given we find only limited evidence such LBOs have 
negative job security implications. As such, the findings indicate AIFMD 1 imposes 
unnecessary burdens on the PE industry, rather than supporting the Party of European 
Socialists’ view that AIFMD 1 did not go far enough. 
The analysis presented here contains several strengths, not least the representativeness 
of the data, the inclusion of a non-LBO control group and protection from common method 
bias given the dependent and independent variables used in the analysis were drawn from 
separate data sources. Nevertheless, it also contains several caveats and suggestions for future 
research. First, sample selection bias may explain the lack of a negative LBO effect. This 
might occur if LBO workplaces typically had higher job security pre-buyout relative to other 
workplaces, which subsequently reduced post-buyout to the same level as elsewhere. To 
explore this possibility, we conducted post-hoc tests drawing on the WERS panel data to 
evaluate whether non-LBO workplaces in the 2004 panel wave that subsequently became 
LBOs had particularly high levels of job security. Bearing in mind that only 21 workplaces in 
the WERS 2004 data fit this profile, our analysis found (in support of the selection effects 
argument) these workplaces were less likely to use temporary/ fixed-term contract workers 
and agency staff. Against this, however, none of the workplaces that later became LBOs had 
a job security/ no-compulsory redundancies policy, and they all used contracting out. Beyond 
this, there was no evidence of other differences in job security either at workplace level or 
with regard to individual perceptions. Therefore, although the analysis is based on only a 
small number of LBO workplaces, the overall pattern of findings does not indicate LBO 
workplaces had higher levels of job security pre-buyout, which the LBO subsequently 
reduced. As such, it is unlikely sample selection bias affects our results.  
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Second, given WERS 2011 is a survey of existing workplaces, we are unable to 
analyse whether LBOs lead to higher workplace closure rates. This is a significant caveat 
given this is a particularly severe form of job insecurity. However, firm-level quantitative 
analysis, controlling for debt ratios and other factors, shows LBOs are no more likely to fail 
than non-LBOs (Wilson and Wright 2013). Nevertheless, future analysis might usefully 
explore this matter further.   
Third, there is no guarantee the findings would hold outside Britain, hence future 
studies might explore other national contexts. However, if LBOs do not increase job 
insecurity in Britain despite its liberal-market economy and limited statutory protection 
against job insecurity, it is unlikely that such effects will emerge in coordinated-market 
economies offering greater employment protection. 
Fourth, focusing on job insecurity does not rule out other potential sources of value 
transfer from employees to investors of legitimate concern to regulators. These might include 
potential reductions in training, job quality or employee voice. Future studies might explore 
whether LBOs are associated with any of these negative outcomes.  
Fifth, while our analysis shows the value of exploring the association between 
different LBO types and job insecurity, future studies might explore a range of further LBO 
types such as secondary buyouts (IUF/UITA/IUL 2007: 14), or ‘efficiency’ versus ‘failure’ 
buyouts (Wright et al. 2000).  
  Finally, although our findings offer little support for LBO critics, the analysis does 
not rule out the possibility of negative LBO spillover effects on job security in non-LBO 
firms. Similar job insecurity levels in LBOs and non-LBOs may reflect the market for 
corporate control, whereby the threat of being bought-out exerts downward pressure on 
labour costs in all firms. As such, LBOs may exert market discipline on senior executives in 
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non-LBOs, resulting in higher job insecurity in these firms as well as in LBOs. Future 
research might evaluate this spillover argument.   
Despite these caveats, the findings presented here help develop understanding of the 
employment implications of LBOs. The findings suggest these implications appear benign 
where job security outcomes are concerned.  
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Marsden and the reviewers for their insightful guidance, and Kevin Amess and Achim 






1. LBOs in which PE firms: provide financial support to incumbent managers to 
purchase the firm (PE-backed management buyouts); buy a firm with a view to 
managing it directly; or provide financial backing to allow an external management 
team to purchase the firm. 
2. LBOs in which a management team from outside the company purchases the firm 
with either PE or non-PE external finance. Managers coming in from outside would 
have some equity to align incentives (either direct equity holdings or stock options). 
3. CMBOR lacks information on some LBOs’ debt ratios, resulting in 86 LBO 
workplaces being dropped from our analysis. 
4. Given missing data, 11 LBO workplaces are dropped from the analysis.  
5. For details on the WERS sampling frame and the weights applied see 
http://www.wers2011.info/methodology/4587717348 
6. For brevity, only the main study variable coefficients and standard errors are 
presented for each equation. Appendix Table 2 reports a full equation with 
coefficients and standard errors for both the main study variables and the control 
variables for equation 1 in Table 1.  
7. WERS also asks management respondents whether, in the past two years, the 
establishment has undergone a management buy-out, buy-out by employees or 
acquisition by venture capital/PE. This question is problematic as it only asks about 
the past two years and conflates venture capital and PE. It also suffers potential 
measurement bias in assuming respondents (the most senior workplace manager 
responsible for employment relations issues) are reliable witnesses of corporate 
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ownership. We nevertheless used the WERS measure to provide a robustness check 
for the results presented in Table 1 by repeating the analysis using the WERS rather 
than the CMBOR measure. This analysis identified no systematic evidence to suggest 
poorer job security in LBOs than in non-LBOs, thereby further supporting the results 
in Table 1. 
8. The analysis hereon includes both current and exited LBOs. However, as a sensitivity 
test we also re-estimated the equations excluding former LBOs. This was possible for 
PE-backed/ non-PE-backed LBOs and management buy-ins, but not for short/ long 
hold LBOs (as it is largely not possible to tell if an LBO is short/ long-hold until it has 
exited), or high/ low debt-ratio LBOs and perfect storm LBOs (due to insufficient 
observations). Nevertheless, the results for PE-backed/ non-PE-backed LBOs and 
management buy-ins were not qualitatively different from those in Tables 3 and 4. We 
also re-estimated the analysis excluding ‘distant’ LBOs that exited more than 6 years 
ago, but retaining ‘recent’ LBOs that exited within the previous six years. Although 
the number of observations was low in the high/ low-debt ratio and the perfect storm 
analysis, the results were not qualitatively different from Tables 3-7. 
9. Of the 44 workplaces in the non-PE-backed LBO category, 12 are management buy-
ins. The theoretical reasons why management buy-ins might negatively impact job 
security are similar to those for PE-backed LBOs. Hence, in estimating the difference 
between PE-backed and non-PE-backed LBOs, one must arguably exclude 
management buy-ins from the non-PE-backed LBO category. In re-estimating the 
equations accounting for this, the results were qualitatively unchanged from those in 
Table 3. 
10. Of the 69 workplaces in the management buyout category, 37 are PE-backed. The 
theoretical reasons why PE-backed LBOs might negatively impact job security are 
similar to those for management buy-ins. Hence, in estimating the difference between 
management buyouts and management buy-ins, one must arguably drop PE-backed 
management buyouts from the management buyout category. In re-estimating the 
equations accounting for this, the results were qualitatively unchanged from those in 
Table 4. 
11. Continuous data for buyout length are available in the CMBOR database. However, 
these data are converted into a categorical variable in the analysis in Table 5 to 
facilitate comparison against non-LBOs. As a robustness test we repeated the analysis 
using a continuous buyout length variable (excluding non-LBOs) to assess whether 
job security varies between longer/ shorter-hold LBOs. The results showed no 
consistent association between buyout length and job insecurity. 
12. As we lack data on the debt ratios of all LBOs, this analysis is based on a restricted 
sample, thus explaining why all LBOs engaged in redundancy consultation here, but 
not in the analyses in Tables 1-5. 
13. Continuous LBO debt ratio data are available in the CMBOR database. However, 
these data are converted into a categorical variable in the analysis in Table 6 to 
facilitate comparison against non-LBOs. A robustness test using a continuous debt 
ratio variable (excluding non-LBOs) revealed no consistent association between LBO 
debt ratio and job insecurity. 
14. For example, although PSE (2007) reported initial employment decline in over half of 
LBOs assessed, inconsistent reporting makes it difficult to identify whether LBOs 
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Table 1: LBOs and job insecurity 









LBO 0.066  (0.349) -0.374  (0.365) -0.100  (0.472) -0.263  (0.416) 
F 4.32 3.31 1.68 1.70 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.005 
N 1,534 1,559 468 430 





workers doing work 
previously done by 
permanent 
employees2 
(8) Proportion of 
employees who are 
temporary agency 
staff1 
LBO -0.084  (0.409) 0.467  (0.378) 0.385  (0.358) 0.367  (0.576) 
F 3.13 4.06 2.18 6.57 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 1,510 1,571 650 1,550 
 (9) Agency staff 
doing work 
previously done by 
permanent 
employees2 
(10) Any contracting 
out2 
(11) Contracting out 
breadth3 
(12) Employee 
perceptions of job 
security4 
LBO -0.377  (0.336) -0.295  (0.244) -0.237  (0.088)*** 0.023  (0.058) 
F 1.28 1.31 5.94  
Prob>F 0.121 0.089 0.000  
Wald chi2    640.54 

















All private sector workplaces.  
Coefficients given, standard errors in brackets. 
***p<0.01.  
All equations control for: organisation size; log of workplace size; single independent workplace; SIC major 
group; national ownership; workplace age; union recognition; proportion of workforce female, ethnic 
minority, aged 50+, part-time; proportion of workforce in each SOC major group. 
Employee perceptions of job security also controls for respondent’s: SOC major group; pay band; marital 
status; age; job tenure; highest qualification; part-time, temporary or fixed-term contract; union membership; 
ethnicity; gender; disability; dependent children. 
1 Fractional logit analysis. 
2 Probit analysis. 
3 Poisson analysis. 





Table 2: Job insecurity in current and exited LBOs 
 (1) Redundancy 
rate1 








Reference category:  
Non-LBOs 
   
Current LBOs -0.495  (0.582) -1.401  (0.443)*** 0.007  (0.736) -1.187  (0.502)** 
Exited<6 years ago 0.057  (0.607) -0.700  (0.537) -0.806  (0.725) -0.220  (0.747) 
Exited≥6 years ago 0.478  (0.461) 0.053  (0.498) (a) 0.382  (0.735) 
F 4.35 3.19 1.65 1.72 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.004 
N 1,534 1,559 448 430 





workers doing work 
previously done by 
permanent 
employees2 
(8) Proportion of 
employees who are 
temporary agency 
staff1 
Reference category:  
Non-LBOs 
   
Current LBOs -0.212  (0.568) 0.496  (0.518) -0.918  (0.485)* 1.039  (0.730) 
Exited<6 years ago -0.168  (1.009) 0.367  (1.138) 0.409  (0.454) 0.015  (0.670) 
Exited≥6 years ago 0.197  (0.554) 0.480  (0.631) 1.715  (0.402)*** -1.010  (0.588)* 
F 3.11 3.91 2.38 6.69 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 1,510 1,571 650 1,550 
 (9) Agency staff 
doing work 
previously done by 
permanent 
employees2 
(10) Any contracting 
out2 
(11) Contracting out 
breadth3 
(12) Employee 
perceptions of job 
security4 
Reference category:  
Non-LBOs 
   
Current LBOs -1.295  (0.492)*** -0.258  (0.333) -0.373  (0.126)*** 0.071  (0.077) 
Exited<6 years ago 0.217  (0.590) -0.422  (0.476) -0.004  (0.144) -0.099  (0.109) 
Exited≥6 years ago 0.363  (0.627) -0.272  (0.345) -0.210  (0.144) 0.084  (0.096) 
F 1.36 1.29 5.69  
Prob>F 0.066 0.098 0.000  
Wald chi2    644.41 
Prob>chi2    0.000 
Level 1    0.793 
Level 2    0.156 
N 440 1,571 1,571 9,883 
Notes: 
All private sector workplaces.  
Coefficients given, standard errors in brackets. 
*p<0.10. **p<0.05. ***p<0.01.  
Controls as Table 1. 
(a) all workplaces engaged in redundancy consultation. 
1 Fractional logit analysis. 
2 Probit analysis. 
3 Poisson analysis. 





Table 3: Job insecurity in PE-backed and non-PE-backed LBOs 
 (1) Redundancy 
rate1 









Reference category:  
PE-backed LBO 
   
Non-PE-backed 
LBO 
0.040  (0.613) -0.535  (0.622) -1.249  (0.895) -0.478  (0.594) 
Non-LBO -0.059  (0.391) 0.294  (0.398) -0.533  (0.719) 0.152  (0.516) 
F 4.14 3.25 1.63 1.64 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.008 
N 1,534 1,559 468 430 
 (5) Dismissal 
rate1 





workers doing work 
previously done by 
permanent 
employees2 
(8) Proportion of 





   
Non-PE-backed 
LBO 
0.355  (0.704) 0.828  (0.795) 0.583  (0.588) -0.212  (0.994) 
Non-LBO 0.171  (0.503) -0.257  (0.420) -0.207  (0.418) -0.423  (0.751) 
F 3.17 4.12 2.20 6.58 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 1,510 1,571 650 1,550 







(11) Contracting out 
breadth3 
(12) Employee 




   
Non-PE-backed 
LBO 
0.671  (0.630) -0.793  (0.470)* -0.161  (0.187) -0.190  (0.115)* 
Non-LBO 0.599  (0.426) 0.095  (0.270) 0.204  (0.097)** -0.078  (0.066) 
F 1.29 1.38 5.85  
Prob>F 0.107 0.056 0.000  
Wald chi2    640.19 


















All private sector workplaces.  
Coefficients given, standard errors in brackets. 
*p<0.10. **p<0.05. 
Controls as Table 1. 
1 Fractional logit analysis. 
2 Probit analysis. 
3 Poisson analysis. 




Table 4: Job insecurity in management buy-ins and management buyouts  









Reference category:  
Management buy-in 
   
Management 
buyout 
1.404  (0.785)* 1.340  (0.597)** 0.616  (1.082) 0.753  (0.733) 
Non-LBO 0.701  (0.674) 0.950  (0.312)*** 0.568  (0.928) 0.731  (0.570) 
F 4.65 3.37 1.67 1.70 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.005 
N 1,534 1,559 468 430 





workers doing work 
previously done by 
permanent 
employees2 
(8) Proportion of 





   
Management 
buyout 
1.527  (0.746)** -0.678  (1.040) -0.078  (0.602) -0.392  (0.901) 
Non-LBO 0.681  (0.586) -0.644  (0.419) -0.412  (0.456) -0.501  (0.762) 
F 3.20 4.06 2.14 6.62 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 1,510 1,571 650 1,550 
 (9) Agency staff 
doing work 





(11) Contracting out 
breadth3 
(12) Employee 




   
Management 
buyout 
1.401  (0.685)** -0.415  (0.448) 0.143  (0.168) -0.172  (0.101)* 
Non-LBO 1.243  (0.635)* 0.182  (0.274) 0.283  (0.110)** -0.111  (0.078) 
F 1.35 1.34 5.83  
Prob>F 0.072 0.071 0.000  
Wald chi2    648.02 

















All private sector workplaces.  
Coefficients given, standard errors in brackets. 
*p<0.10. **p<0.05. ***p<0.01.  
Controls as Table 1. 
1 Fractional logit analysis. 
2 Probit analysis. 
3 Poisson analysis. 





Table 5: Job insecurity in short and long hold LBOs 








Reference category:  
Short-hold LBOa 
   
Long-hold LBOb 0.362  (0.666) -1.185  (0.555)** 1.660  (0.935)* 1.158  (0.770) 
Non-LBO 0.166  (0.594) 0.135  (0.419) 1.313  (0.740)* 1.022  (0.619)* 
F 4.27 3.25 1.68 1.70 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.005 
N 1,534 1,559 468 430 





workers doing work 
previously done by 
permanent 
employees2 
(8) Proportion of 





   
Long-hold LBO -0.825  (0.695) 0.557  (0.789) -1.627  (0.555)*** 2.017  (0.795)*** 
Non-LBO -0.356  (0.557) -0.091  (0.639) -1.373  (0.424)*** 1.131  (0.550)** 
F 3.07 3.99 2.31 6.78 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 1,510 1,571 650 1,550 
 (9) Agency staff 
doing work 
previously done by 
permanent 
employees2 
(10) Any contracting 
out2 
(11) Contracting out 
breadth3 
(12) Employee 




   
Long-hold LBO -0.441  (0.720) -0.645  (0.389)* -0.193  (0.163) -0.068  (0.112) 
Non-LBO 0.068  (0.610) -0.110  (0.283) 0.130  (0.108) -0.064  (0.096) 
F 1.25 1.38 5.78  
Prob>F 0.141 0.054 0.000  
Wald chi2    646.67 

















All private sector workplaces.  
Coefficients given, standard errors in brackets. 
*p<0.10. **p<0.05. ***p<0.01.  
Controls as Table 1. 
a Short-hold LBO (0 to <4 years) 
b Long-hold LBO (4 years+) 
1 Fractional logit analysis. 
2 Probit analysis. 
3 Poisson analysis. 




Table 6: Job insecurity in high and low debt ratio LBOs 
 (1) Redundancy 
rate1 









Reference category:  
High-debt ratio 
LBOa 
    
Low-debt ratio LBOb -0.405  (1.002) 1.870  (0.727)** (a) -2.759  (1.134)** 
Non-LBO -0.011  (0.608) 0.957  (0.421)**  -1.673  (0.970)* 
F 3.74 3.40  1.61 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000  0.011 
N 1,451 1,474  401 





workers doing work 
previously done by 
permanent 
employees2 
(8) Proportion of 




High-debt ratio LBO 
   
Low-debt ratio LBO -0.079  (1.024) 1.564  (1.364) 1.513  (0.918) -0.525  (0.970) 
Non-LBO -0.485  (0.622) 0.566  (0.702) -0.917  (0.602) 1.218  (0.755) 
F 2.78 4.49 2.14 8.37 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 1,427 1,485 611 1,464 
 (9) Agency staff 
doing work 





(11) Contracting out 
breadth3 
(12) Employee 
perceptions of job 
security4 
Reference category: 
High-debt ratio LBO 
   
Low-debt ratio LBO 0.584  (0.978) -0.919  (0.569) -0.257  (0.252) -0.259  (0.222) 
Non-LBO -0.021  (0.719) -0.272  (0.374) 0.163  (0.113) -0.231  (0.076)*** 
F 1.42 1.42 5.28  
Prob>F 0.046 0.044 0.000  
Wald chi2    665.80 

















All private sector workplaces.  
Coefficients given, standard errors in brackets. 
*p<0.10. **p<0.05. ***p<0.01.  
Controls as Table 1. 
(a) All LBOs (and 84% of non-LBOs) engaged in redundancy consultation. 
a Debt ratio <50% 
b Debt ratio ≥50% 
1 Fractional logit analysis. 
2 Probit analysis. 
3 Poisson analysis. 





Table 7: Job insecurity in perfect storm LBOs  
 (1 ) Redundancy 
rate1 











Perfect storm LBO 
(a)  (a) (a) 
Non-perfect storm LBO  0.746 (0.627)   
Non-LBO  0.946 (0.511)*   
F  3.29   
Prob>F  0.000   
N  1,548   





workers doing work 
previously done by 
permanent 
employees2 





Perfect storm LBO 
    
Non-perfect storm LBO -0.381 (0.897) 0.811 (0.988) -0.078 (0.773) 1.104 (1.122) 
Non-LBO -0.255 (0.810) 0.219 (0.898) -0.445 (0.715) 0.603 (0.953) 
F 3.16 4.04 2.14 6.54 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 1,499 1,560 646 1,539 
 (9) Agency staff 
doing work 








perceptions of job 
security4 
Reference category: 
Perfect storm LBO 
    
Non-perfect storm LBO 1.509 (0.795)* -0.925 (0.459)** -0.090 (0.174) -0.353 (0.099)*** 
Non-LBO 1.874 (0.750)** -0.461 (0.419) 0.211 (0.148) -0.340 (0.088)*** 
F 1.32 1.43 5.79  
Prob>F 0.091 0.040 0.000  
Wald chi2    662.17 








All private sector workplaces.  
Coefficients given, standard errors in brackets. 
*p<0.10. **p<0.05. ***p<0.01.  
Controls as Table 1. 
(a) No redundancies in any perfect storm LBOs. 
1 Fractional logit analysis. 
2 Probit analysis. 
3 Poisson analysis 





Appendix Table 1: Variable means 
Mean   
Dependent variables  
Dismissal rate 0.017 
Redundancy rate 0.015 
Job security/ no-compulsory redundancies policy 0.047 
Redundancy consultation 0.842 
Positive change resulting from redundancy consultation 0.381 
Proportion of workforce on fixed-term contracts 0.064 
Fixed-term workers doing work previously done by permanent employees 0.373 
Proportion of employees who are temporary agency staff 0.012 
Agency staff doing work previously done by permanent employees 0.434 
Any contracting out 0.857 
Number of activities contracted out (0-11) 2.928 
I feel my job is secure in this workplace (employee survey) (1=strongly 
disagree, 5=strongly agree) 
3.587 
  
Independent variables  
LBO 0.078 
Current LBO 0.046 
Exited<6 years ago 0.014 
Exited≥6 years ago  0.018 
PE-backed LBO 0.063 
Non-PE-backed LBO 0.015 
Management buy-in 0.060 
Management buyout 0.018 
Short-hold LBO (0 to <4 years) 0.033 
Long-hold LBO (≥4 years) 0.046 
Low-debt LBO (Debt ratio <50%) 0.010 
High-debt LBO (Debt ratio ≥50%) 0.023 
Perfect storm LBO 0.015 
Non-perfect storm LBO 0.060 
  
Control variables  
Organisation size (employees)  
5-49  0.560 
50-249  0.122 
250-499  0.033 
500-999  0.039 
1,000-4,999  0.104 
5,000-9,999  0.058 
10,000+ 0.084 
Log of workplace size (mean workplace size: 26.459) 2.600 
Single independent workplace 0.485 
SIC Major group  
Manufacturing 0.103 
Electricity, gas, steam, and air conditioning supply 0.001 
Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities 0.004 
Construction 0.061 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 0.276 
Accommodation and food service activities 0.030 
Transport and storage 0.098 
Information and communication 0.040 
Financial and insurance activities 0.014 




Professional, scientific and technical activities 0.092 
Administrative and support service activities 0.065 
Public administration and defence; compulsory social security/ Education 0.037 
Human health and social work activities 0.096 
Arts, entertainment and recreation 0.020 
Other service activities 0.029 
National ownership  
UK 0.929 
North American 0.025 
Other European Union 0.034 
Rest of World 0.012 
Workplace Age (years)  
0 to <5 0.106 
5 to <10 0.222 
10 to <20 0.274 
20+ 0.398 
Union recognition 0.117 
Proportion of workforce:  
Female 0.502 
Ethnic minority 0.069 
Aged 50+ 0.234 
Part-time 0.294 
Proportion of workforce in SOC major group  
Managers and senior officials 0.189 
Professionals 0.087 
Associate professional/ technical occupations 0.085 
Administrative and secretarial occupations 0.117 
Skilled trades occupations 0.091 
Caring, leisure and other personal service occupations 0.080 
Sales and customer service occupations 0.179 
Process, plant, and machine operatives and drivers 0.065 
Routine occupations 0.105 
  
Additional controls for individual level analysis  
Respondent’s SOC major group  
Manager or senior official 0.097 
Professional 0.157 
Associate professional or technical 0.174 
Administrative and secretarial 0.156 
Skilled trades 0.085 
Caring, leisure and other personal service 0.061 
Sales and customer service 0.085 
Process, plant and machine operatives and drivers 0.082 
Routine occupations 0.104 
Pay band (per week)  
£60 or less  0.025 
£61-£100  0.037 
£101-£130 0.033 
£131-£170  0.041 
£171-£220  0.060 
£221-£260  0.067 
£261-£310  0.089 
£311-£370  0.103 
£371-£430  0.106 
£431-£520  0.114 




£821-£1,050  0.058 
£1,051+  0.071 
Marital status  
Single 0.249 
Married 0.677 
Divorced/ separated/ widowed 0.073 








Respondent’s tenure (years)  
<1  0.142 
1 to <2  0.117 
2 to <5  0.262 
5 to <10  0.243 
10+ 0.236 
Highest academic qualification  
None 0.077 
Other 0.022 
GCSE grade D-G 0.055 
GCSE grade A-C 0.192 
A-level 0.243 
Degree 0.313 
Higher degree 0.098 
Part-time 0.250 
Temporary/ fixed-term contract 0.063 
Union member 0.188 
Ethnicity  
White   0.917 
Mixed   0.014 
Asian or Asian British   0.041 
Black   0.019 
Other   0.010 
Female 0.468 
Disabled 0.080 




Appendix Table 2: Redundancy rates in LBOs full equation (Table 1, equation 1) 
 
Redundancy rate  
Coeff. Std. error 
LBO 0.066 (0.349)    
Organisation size (employees) (reference category: 5-49) 
  
50-249  0.253 (0.450) 
250-499  -0.413 (0.624) 
500-999  0.644 (0.658) 
1,000-4,999  -0.104 (0.588) 
5,000-9,999  -0.621 (0.871) 
10,000+ -0.109 (0.754)    
Log of workplace size  0.022 (0.104) 
Single independent workplace 0.251 (0.482)    
SIC Major Group (reference category: manufacturing) 
  
Electricity, gas, steam,  and air conditioning supply -0.772 (0.783) 
Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities -1.180 (0.998) 
Construction 0.853 (0.537) 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 0.149 (0.565) 
Accommodation and food service activities -0.434 (0.754) 
Transport and storage 0.538 (0.798) 
Information and communication 0.535 (0.578) 
Financial and insurance activities 0.447 (0.655) 
Real estate activities 0.072 (0.640) 
Professional, scientific and technical activities 1.174** (0.465) 
Administrative and support service activities -1.416** (0.668) 
Public administration and defence; compulsory social security/ Education 2.738*** (0.591) 
Human health and social work activities 0.316 (0.590) 
Arts, entertainment and recreation 0.290 (0.693) 
Other service activities 1.006 (0.637)    
National Ownership (reference category: UK-owned) 
  
North American 1.690*** (0.419) 
Other European Union -0.479 (0.605) 
Rest of World 0.802 (0.605)    
Workplace age (years) (reference category: 0 to <5) 
  
5 to <10 0.923* (0.515) 
10 to <20 1.158** (0.521) 
20+ 0.672 (0.510)    
Union recognition 0.918*** (0.344) 
Proportion of the workforce: 
  
Female -0.815 (0.531) 
Ethnic minority 1.088* (0.604) 
Aged 50+ 0.886 (0.607) 
Part-time -1.257** (0.580) 
Professionals -1.809* (1.065) 
Associate professional/ technical occupations -0.163 (1.010) 
Administrative and secretarial occupations -0.186 (1.080) 
Skilled trades occupations -0.532 (1.001) 
Caring, leisure and other personal service occupations -2.028* (1.190) 
Sales and customer service occupations -1.240 (0.969) 
Process, plant,  and machine operatives and drivers -1.647 (1.057) 










Fractional logit analysis 
Coefficients given, standard errors in brackets. 
*p<0.10. **p<0.05. ***p<0.01.  
 
 
